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I. Introduction 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission was formed as a result of the stock market 
crash of 1929. During the crash, the market value of securities listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange dropped 83%, from $89 billion to $15 billion. Some of the causes of the crash were 
found to be a pre-crash speculative frenzy, artificially inflated trading activity, false and 
misleading information published by companies listed on the exchange, and insider trading.1 
Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to regulate 
companies that wanted to raise capital through the financial markets. The SEC was formed in 
1934 to enforce these laws, protect investors, and maintain the integrity of the markets. SEC 
investigations have been a vital tool to allow the SEC to fulfill its objectives. 
 The purpose of this paper is to provide insight on the events that surround the 
announcement of an SEC investigation of a company, which includes the equity market’s 
reaction to the announcement, the events leading up to the announcement, and the performance 
of the stock following the announcement. One cannot discuss investigations of fraud without 
considering corporate governance. This paper will also test the hypothesis that companies with 
strong corporate governance have lower agency costs, so investors’ reactions to accusations of 
possible fraud will be less severe. 
II. Background on SEC Investigations 
 Following an announcement by a company that it will restate past earnings, the SEC will 
generally commence an informal investigation that looks into the events that led up to the 
restatement. As the investigation proceeds, if the SEC finds sufficient reason to believe that fraud 
                                                 
1 Afterman, Allan B., SEC Regulation of Public Companies, (Prentice-Hall, 1995). 
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did occur, the SEC can issue a formal order of investigation. The formal order allows the SEC to 
issue subpoenas that provide greater access to company documents and executives. A formal 
order may also be issued without a prior informal investigation. The SEC does not publicly 
announce the initiation of SEC investigations. Therefore, disclosure comes as a result of the 
company issuing a press release or through a filing made by the company with the SEC.  
There is a clear distinction between the wording companies will use when they disclose 
informal and formal investigations. Investors will try to value the immensity of the investigation 
through the information provided by the company. Therefore, it is important to analyze the two 
types of investigations separately. 
III. Data Sample 
 Because the SEC does not publicly disclose the initiation of an investigation, to gather 
the sample data I was reliant on the companies to disclose the event to investors through its 
annual filings with the SEC.  
The sample time period for events to occur was defined to be 1998 through 2003. There 
were between 8,000 and 11,000 10-K’s filed with the SEC each year from 1998 to 2004. A 
program was used to download all 10-K’s filed with the SEC during this period from the SEC 
website. Another program searched through each 10-K, looking for announcements of SEC 
investigations. Two methods were used to find the disclosures: 1) the program searched for the 
“Legal Proceedings” section of each 10-K. Within this section, any mention of the SEC (or any 
variant on the name) was flagged. 2) The program searched the entire text of the 10-K for any 
mention of the SEC (or any variant on the name). It then searched for words such as 
investigation, complaint, injunction, action against, violation, or enforcement action within two 
text lines of the SEC reference. The program flagged all matches.  
3 
Because the layout and format of the 10-K’s varied for each filing, and often the words 
SEC and investigation were in close proximity, but not as the result of an SEC investigation 
disclosure (particularly within the Sarbanes-Oxley sections of later filings), the program flagged 
many false positives. Each reference found by the program was manually checked to narrow 
down the list to actual SEC investigations of companies. SEC investigations relating solely to the 
actions of current or previous company executives were not included. 
From this list I was able to backtrack from the original 10-K filing, looking in previous 
year’s annual, quarterly, and current filings, as well as press releases to arrive at the exact date 
that the investigation was made public. For each investigation reference, I also looked for the 
data relating to the informal or formal investigation announcement, depending on which was 
originally found.  If there were no press releases or 8-K filings with the SEC that referenced the 
investigation, I had to rely on the first occurrence of the investigation within a quarterly or 
annual filing as the date that the investigation was made public. Of the entire sample of informal 
and formal investigations, 65% were found in press releases, 7% in 8-K’s, 12% in quarterly 
reports, and 16% in annual reports. 
The data sample for which returns existed within the CRSP database consists of 71 
informal investigation and 174 formal investigation events. For 34 companies, announcements of 
informal and formal investigations were found. Therefore, 34 companies that are included in the 
formal investigation sample are also included in the sample of informal investigations.  
This procedure produced an unbiased sample of SEC investigations. The search program 
undoubtedly missed some SEC investigation references, or some companies may have chosen 
not to disclose an investigation within its annual reports. Therefore, the data sample should not 
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be considered to be the entire universe of SEC investigations that were announced during the 
sample period.  
IV. Data Analysis Tools 
 The Eventus software program was used to calculate the abnormal returns of the stocks 
following the announcements of the investigations. Eventus analyzes stock returns that it reads 
from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. For each stock, it estimates a 
beta using an estimation period that ends before the event date. It then calculates the abnormal 
return for the stock during the event window by subtracting from the actual return the normal 
return for the stock, given the market’s return during the event window. The market was defined 
to be a value weighted portfolio of all stocks within the CRSP database during the event period. 
The CRSP database includes stock price, volume, and return information from the NYSE, 
AMEX, and Nasdaq markets. 
 The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) provides research on corporate 
governance, proxy voting, and corporate responsibility issues. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick used 
data published by the IRRC to construct a governance index that covers about 1,500 companies. 
The index is a measurement of the balance of power between shareholders and managers. A 
rating for each firm is calculated by adding one point for each provision that reduces shareholder 
rights, with a maximum rating of 24. Firms with low governance index ratings will have low 
management power and strong shareholder rights. Firms with high governance index ratings will 
have high management power and weak shareholder rights.2 
 OptionMetrics is a database of historical price and implied volatility data for the U.S. 
equity and index options markets. OptionMetrics computes a volatility surface through 
                                                 
2 Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (Feb 2003), 107-155. 
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interpolation of implied volatilities of similar options. OptionMetrics volatility surface was used 
to analyze the change in the implied volatilities of the options on the underlying stocks in the 
investigation samples on the days leading up to the announcements.  
V. Event Study Results 
 A window of -1 to +1 days from the event date was used to calculate the cumulative 
abnormal returns for the informal and formal investigations. During the window around the 
announcement of informal investigations, the mean cumulative abnormal return is -6.18%, 
significant at 0.1%. The median abnormal return is -3.15%. During the window around the 
announcement of formal investigations, the mean cumulative abnormal return is -6.23%, 
significant at 0.1%, with a median abnormal return of -3.05%.  
The abnormal return for the sample of 34 companies that had previous informal 
investigation announcements is -8.50%, significant at the 0.1% level. The additional decline in 
value results from the escalation to a formal order, which implies a longer investigation period 
resulting in higher legal expenses, and the SEC found sufficient reason to continue the 
investigation. The average number of days between the informal and formal investigation 
announcements in the sample is 138 days. Some companies in the formal investigation sample 
may have had previous informal investigations that occurred before the beginning of the sample 
period. Therefore, the analysis of returns for companies in the formal investigation sample that 
are not included in the informal investigation sample is not relevant.  
VI. Events Prior to Announcement Date 
The decline in market value as a result of the announcement of an informal or formal 
investigation is similar; for both events, there is an abnormal return of about -6%. However, 
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informal and formal investigations differ greatly with respect to the events that lead up to the 
announcement. Put and call option implied volatilities were used to analyze the market’s 
uncertainty of the stock’s value prior to the investigation announcements. Implied option 
volatility has been found to be a very good predictor of future volatility for stock indexes3 and 
individual stocks4.  
Option volatility surfaces calculate the implied volatilities on virtual options with the 
same maturity and delta ratio at different points in time. The implied volatility is computed 
through interpolation using traded options with maturities and delta ratios that straddle the 
maturities and delta ratios of the options in the volatility surface. Therefore, the effects of time to 
maturity and movement of the underlying asset price are not reflected in the volatility surface. 
The change in implied volatilities across time is only a function of the markets perception of the 
future distribution of the underlying asset’s value.  
The implied volatilities of at the money puts and calls with 30 days and 60 days to 
maturity were compared for each day leading up to the event for informal and formal 
investigations. 30 and 60 day maturity options were chosen because of their high liquidity. For 
each trading day prior to the event, the average implied volatility across the sample for each 
option was computed. Option data is not available for all stocks within the investigation samples. 
The table below provides the range of the number of stocks with available option data that were 
included in the daily average implied volatilities, and the two graphs chart the results. 
Informal Investigations Formal Investigations
Option Data Option Data
30 Day ATM Calls and Puts 36 to 42 79 to 86
60 Day ATM Calls and Puts 39 to 43 84 to 92  
                                                 
3 Christensen, B.J., N.R. Prabhala, “The Relation Between Implied and Realized Volatility,” Journal of Financial 
Economics 50 (1998) 125-150. 
4 Lamoureux, Christopher G., William D. Lastrapes, “Forecasting Stock-Return Variance: Toward an Understanding 
of Stochastic Implied Volatilities,” The Review of Financial Studies (1993 Volume 6, number 2) 293-326. 
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The graph of the implied volatilities for options of informal investigation events shows a 
steady increase across the 35 day period; on the days leading up to the event, the value of at the 
money puts and calls is steadily increasing. The graph of the implied volatilities for options of 
formal investigation events shows a sudden rise at about 8 to 10 trading days prior to the event. 
There is a steady, slight decline in the implied volatilities of at the money options at days greater 
than 10, but at day 10, the 60 day options’ implied volatilities begin to rise and at 8 days prior, 
the 30 day options’ implied volatilities jump. 
 Informal investigations generally follow earnings restatements. Earnings restatements 
increase the uncertainty about the firms’ value as the market attempts to assess the implications 
for future earnings and cash flows. There is also additional uncertainty due to the possibility of 
an SEC investigation and the most probable outcome if it were to occur. This uncertainty is 
reflected in the steady rise in implied volatilities prior to informal investigation announcements. 
In contrast, the announcements of formal investigations are most likely unexpected. At 
days greater than 10 prior to formal investigation announcements, the market’s uncertainty of 
future prices is declining. The sudden increase in implied volatility 8 to 10 days before the 
announcement suggests the existence of information events prior to the investigation 
announcement that increases investors’ uncertainty.  
For both types of investigations, the market’s uncertainty of the stock’s value prior to the 
actual announcement is relatively high. However, neither type of investigation announcement is 
completely anticipated, which is reflected in the large negative abnormal return and the jump in 
implied volatilities as a result of the announcements.  
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VII. Breakdown of Abnormal Returns 
The following table shows the abnormal returns for informal and formal investigations, 
broken down by market capitalization one week prior to the event, the year of the event, and 
governance index rating.  
N Mean Significance N Mean Significance
Overall 71 -6.18% 0.1% 174 -6.23% 0.1%
Market Cap
Micro 21 -3.89% 0.1% 73 -7.23% 0.1%
Small 15 -12.14% 0.1% 27 -7.83% 0.1%
Medium 19 -6.34% 0.1% 25 -8.42% 0.1%
Large 16 -3.40% 1.0% 48 -2.78% 0.1%
Year
1998 3 -3.24% 15 -8.28%
1999 5 -13.86% 11 -6.09%
2000 4 -20.59% 23 -7.65%
2001 4 -2.16% 19 -5.62%
2002 34 -3.86% 51 -5.71%
2003 21 -6.54% 55 -5.78%
Market
Bull ('98, '99, '03) 29 -7.46% 0.1% 81 -6.29% 0.1%
Bear ('00, '01, '02) 42 -5.29% 0.1% 93 -6.17% 0.1%
G Index
Gov >= 9 23 -4.17% 0.1% 46 -7.06% 0.1%
Gov < 9 20 -3.19% 5% 40 -5.48% 0.1%
Formal InvestigationsInformal Investigations
 
 Large market capitalization companies have a smaller decline in value than smaller 
capitalization companies. The market believes that the risk and expenses associated with a SEC 
investigation can be better absorbed by large capitalization companies. Large capitalization 
companies are more deeply covered by analysts. Investors may believe that they better 
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understand the risks associated with large capitalization stocks, so there is less of a reaction to 
the investigation announcements. 
 If 1998, 1999, and 2003 are defined to be bull markets and 2000, 2001, and 2002 to be a 
bear market, the data shows that the market reacts differently to informal investigation 
announcements during each type of market. There is a much smaller decline in value during bear 
markets. 
 To analyze the event results by governance index rating, the most recent governance 
rating prior to the date of the event was used. The average governance rating for all companies 
within the IRRC database for the rating periods 1998, 2000, and 2002 is 8.93. Therefore, the 
abnormal returns given the companies governance index rating relative to the index average is 
computed. Governance ratings are not available for all companies within the sample, so analysis 
by this index reduces the samples. 
 A high governance rating indicates weak shareholder rights and poor corporate 
governance. As may be expected, companies with better corporate governance have a smaller 
decline in value. For companies with strong governance, investors believe that the processes are 
in place to prevent fraud, and if it did occur, for it to be remedied with haste and minimal 
additional expense. 
 The data shows that companies with large market capitalization and companies with 
strong corporate governance will have the smallest decline in market value as a result of the 
announcement of an SEC investigation. However, it is not true that larger market capitalization 
companies have stronger corporate governance; rather, it is the opposite. Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick found a correlation of 0.15, significant at the 1% level, between market capitalization 
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and the governance index rating. 49% of the firms within the highest decile of the governance 
index (the companies with the weakest shareholder rights), are included in the S&P 500.5 
 The following table shows the correlation between the abnormal returns, a dummy 
variable representing large capitalization firms, and the governance index rating for the informal 
and formal investigation samples. 
Return Large Cap Return Large Cap
Large Cap 0.082 Large Cap 0.136
P-value 0.499 P-value 0.075
Gov Rating -0.013 0.303 Gov Rating -0.079 0.357
P-value 0.936 0.048 P-value 0.472 0.001
Informal Investigations Formal Investigations
 
 There is a significant positive correlation between the large capitalization dummy 
variable and the governance rating, and the abnormal returns have a greater correlation with the 
large capitalization dummy variable than the governance rating. This suggests that corporate 
governance is not the dominant factor affecting the market’s reaction to the announcement of 
SEC investigations. 
It is interesting to note that the number of investigation events increases significantly in 
2002. There are several reasons that may explain this increase. The public unraveling of Enron 
began in October 2001. Enron was shortly followed by several corporate scandals, such as Tyco, 
WorldCom, Xerox, Adelphia, Merrill Lynch, and Arthur Anderson. This series of corporate 
fraud rattled investors and made them weary of company management; it created doubt about the 
integrity of the system.6 Therefore, the SEC would want to step up its enforcement actions to 
catch the fraud before investors are harmed and renew the public’s trust in the system. 
                                                 
5 Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick, “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics (Feb 2003), 107-155. 
6 Skousen, Fred K., Steven M. Glover, Douglas F. Prawitt, An Introduction to Corporate Governance and the SEC, 
(Thomson, 2005). 
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 The beginning of 2000 marked the bursting of the technology bubble and the subsequent 
recession. During periods of low profitability, it is more difficult to disguise and sustain 
accounting fraud. Therefore, there will be more accounting restatements, followed by SEC 
investigations. 
The following table shows the number of investigations that were opened by the SEC and 
formal orders issued during its fiscal years, which end September 30.7 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Investigations Opened 520 558 570 479 910
Formal Orders Issued 282 345 324 300 254  
In the fiscal year 2003, the SEC almost doubles the number of investigations opened. The last 
three months of 2002 that coincide with the SEC’s fiscal year 2003 could explain some of the 
increase in investigations in the sample that were made public in 2002. However, the events in 
the sample are defined to be the day that the investigation is made public by the company. The 
increase in the number of events for 2002 is more likely the result of an increase in the number 
of disclosures of SEC investigations, which may have been initiated in previous years. 
VIII. Calendar Portfolios 
 To analyze how the stocks in the samples performed following each event, calendar 
portfolios were constructed. At two days following the announcement of the investigation, one 
share of the stock is added to the portfolio and is held in the portfolio for a defined period of 
time. If at any time during the holding period the stock is delisted, the stock is sold from the 
portfolio the following day. Therefore, the calendar portfolios include the delisting return. 
Abnormal returns for the portfolio were computed using the capital asset pricing model and 
                                                 
7 From SEC Annual Reports for 2003, 2002, 2001, 2000, 1999, http://www.sec.gov/about/annrep.shtml 
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Fama French three factor model. The charts below show the abnormal returns for the portfolios 
for different holding periods. 
Informal Investigation Calendar Portfolios
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Formal Investigation Calendar Portfolios
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 The change in abnormal returns for increasingly longer holding periods for the informal 
investigation portfolios and formal investigation portfolios are very similar. The graphs show 
that following the announcement of an SEC investigation, the stock will continue to 
underperform the market for the next three months. However, after three months, the returns 
improve and the stock returns to breakeven within one year. 
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IX. Conclusion 
Informal SEC investigations generally follow earnings restatements. The implied 
volatilities on put and call options show that prior to the informal investigation announcements 
the market’s uncertainty of future prices is increasing. Following the announcement, the stock 
has an abnormal return of -6.18%. The announcements of formal investigations, in comparison, 
are unexpected. Implied option volatilities do not steadily increase prior to the announcement 
event. Rather, the options show a jump in implied volatility at 8 to 10 days prior to the event. 
Following the formal investigation announcement, the stock has an abnormal return of -6.23%.  
Due to the disclosure of an SEC investigation, the company loses six percent of its 
market value. The six percent in lost value is the market’s assessment of the future legal fees and 
settlement fines, and loss due to a decline in the market’s perception of the company’s corporate 
governance standards. However, it is arguable how heavily the market weighs corporate 
governance, so the loss due to a decline in corporate governance may only be a small portion. In 
the case of the announcement of an SEC investigation, corporate governance is not the main 
factor that affects the amount of value lost. Whether or not the company has a large market 
capitalization has a greater correlation with the abnormal returns.  
For the three months following the investigation announcement, the value of the stock 
continues to underperform the market, as new information regarding the extent of the 
investigation and possible fraud is released. However, after three months, the stocks reflect a 
regression towards the mean; the stocks in the investigation portfolios outperform the market. 
For a holding period of one year, the investigation portfolios have a return that is about equal to 
that of the market. 
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Appendix: 
Top 10 Biggest Decliners 
 
Announcement 
Date
Market 
Cap (-7 
Days)
Governance 
Rating
Abnormal 
Return
Informal Investigations
1. DYNACQ HEALTHCARE INC 12/18/03 224 -80.11%
2. EBT INTERNATIONAL INC/INSO CORP 02/01/99 388 -77.14%
3. PINNACLE HOLDINGS INC 08/07/00 2,717 -39.03%
4. LUMENIS LTD 02/25/02 518 -38.61%
5. NASH FINCH CO 11/08/02 158 15 -34.11%
6. COMPUTER ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL INC 02/22/02 15,586 9 -27.58%
7. SYMBOL TECHNOLOGIES INC 02/15/02 3,058 8 -26.70%
8. MAXIM GROUP INC 07/13/99 162 -22.95%
9. CMS ENERGY CORP 05/10/02 2,703 9 -20.71%
10. IMCLONE SYSTEMS INC 01/25/02 1,547 4 -19.75%
Formal Investigations
1. PENNCORP FINANCIAL GROUP INC 08/20/98 319 6 -79.37%
2. ANIKA THERAPEUTICS INC 05/30/00 82 -77.93%
3. INTERWORLD CORP 04/03/01 9 -77.71%
4. ENTERASYS NETWORKS INC 02/01/02 1,986 10 -57.86%
5. NASH FINCH CO 02/05/03 99 15 -54.12%
6. L90 INC/MAXWORLDWIDE INC 02/04/02 51 -39.50%
7. PINNACLE HOLDINGS INC 10/12/00 1,250 -33.90%
8. CRYOLIFE INC 08/05/03 144 -32.88%
9. CENDANT CORP 07/14/98 19,100 11 -32.05%
10. CRITICAL PATH INC 04/05/01 116 -27.56%
 
 
